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LEGAL DRAFTING: WRITING AS THINKING, OR,
TALK-BACK FROM YOUR DRAFT AND HOW
TO EXPLOIT IT
REED DICKERSON *
Introduction
Let me begin by referring to what seems to be almost a conspiracy to keep
Americans from learning how to write. Fortunately, the Ed Newmans, the
media, and the many critics of our laws and legal instruments have so fully
exposed this inability that it needs no documenting here. Instead, I will sug-
gest an explanation for it that relates to what lawyers and law schools are
currently doing. This will lead us into our main theme.
Perhaps the most critical fact is that our universities are almost uniformly
neglecting expository writing.' Take, for instance, Indiana University. Ac-
cording to a recent catalog, its English Department has been offering a total
of 81 courses or seminars reflecting a program overwhelmingly devoted to
the study of "literature." Of these courses, only 12 relate directly to writing
by the student and of the 12 only 6 relate directly to exposition. Of the
6 exposition writing courses, 3 are first-year courses, taught for the most
part by teaching associates. Although every student must take at least one
composition course to qualify for graduation (unless he scored 600 or better
on the SAT Verbal Examination), only a minuscule percentage of the Uni-
versity's undergraduates are exposed to sophisticated courses in composition.
This seems typical of American universities.
Most American law schools teach something called "Legal Research and
Writing", but for the most part it involves instruction by teaching associates
in the soft-core writing of briefs or memoranda, heavily diluted with exer-
cises in traditional legal research that it is better to handle separately. The
result is that, although many students leave law school moderately well
schooled in legal research, their ability to write falls well below their poten-
tial.2
* Professor of Law, Indiana University (Bloomington). Chairman: Indiana Com-
mission on Uniform State Laws. Author: Legislative Drafting (1954); The Funda-
mentals of Legal Drafting (1965); The Interpretation and Application of Statutes
(1975). What follows is an edited version of a talk given at Scribes' first Legal
Writing Institute, held at St. John's University Law School on October 16, 1976.
1 "[There is a] pervasive feeling among teachers of English that their true calling
is to teach literature, with composition classes considered a chore to be suffered
through on their way to greater things." A New Affliction at the Prestige Schools:
"Elite Illiteracy," 77 Brown Alumni Monthly 12, 16 (Oct. 1976), (setting forth the
theories of Brown University's Professor A. D. Van Nostrand).
2 In place of "Legal Research and Writing," I would prefer something in which the
emphasis was shifted from looking for materials to looking for kinks in substantive
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In general, legal writing, including legal drafting, is seriously downgraded
in the law schools. This is mostly by implication. The disciplines of case
analysis are explored throughout the curriculum, while the equally-used dis-
ciplines of planning and synthesis (which normally culminate in the drafting
of a legal instrument) are dealt with, at best, sporadically. Some of this
neglect is due to the law's historical (but now unfortunate) preoccupation
with litigation, whose written work is mostly of the looser kinds. Some is
due to a widespread reluctance of senior law teachers to expose themselves
to the stupefying tedium of scrutinizing each student's written work. (Here,
we need a new pedagogy.) Most of it is due to a failure to adequately ap-
preciate what writing in general, and legal writing in particular, is all about.
The price that we pay for this professional ineptitude in badly botched stat-
utes, regulations, and private legal instruments is exacted not only in im-
mediate confusion and disappointment but in a volume of litigation that no
amount of judicial reform can alleviate.
Writing as Thinking
The prevalent narrow view of writing, which even many professionals share,
is that it is merely putting down what the writer already has in his head;
first the thought, then its expression. Such a view ignores its most impor-
tant potential: By using the best writing strategies, the writer can generate
valuable ideas not only in other heads but also in his own.
A failure to understand what good composition entails has been the most
important force in underestimating it. (No wonder we reserve our academic
accolades for poets, dramatists, novelists, and the other creators of "litera-
ture.") Through a preoccupation with style and verbal cosmetics, we have
trivialized expository writing as an intellectually low-level skill.
If my information is correct, the intimate connection between conceptual-
izing and verbalizing is a two-way, not one-way, street. I first got some ink-
ling of this when Professor Warren Seavey once confided in me, during a
walk across campus, that he wrote his articles first and researched them later.
At first I took this as academic wit, but now I believe that to disregard Pro-
fessor Seavey's insight is to waste time and impair quality. To avoid mis-
understanding here, note that he did not say that he started writing with
nothing in his head.
That Professor Seavey had no patent on this approach was illustrated sev-
eral years ago, when Joseph Heller was interviewed in the New York Times
about his working habits in putting together the book, Something Happened.
Again, what first appeared to be flippancy had real substance.
My novels begin in a strange way. I don't begin with a theme, or even
a character. I begin with a first sentence that is independent of any
conscious preparation. Most often nothing comes of it: a sentence
will come to mind that doesn't lead to a second sentence. . . . As
I sat there worrying and wondering what to do, one of those first lines
came to mind. . . . Immediately, the lines presented a whole ex-
plosion of possibilities and choices. . . . Ideas come to me in the
policy and from emotive writing to bard-nosed exposition. Drafting is Ideal for these
purposes, because it involves no sales pitch (or reader lures) and does not try to
create literature.
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course of a sort of controlled daydream, a directed reverie. It may
have something to do with the disciplines of writing advertising copy
. . , where the limitations involved provide a considerable spur to
the imagination. There's an essay of T.S. Eliot's in which he praises
the disciplines of writing, claiming that if one is forced to write within
a certain framework the imagination is taxed to its utmost and will
produce its richest ideas.3
Briefly, then, Heller, like Seavey, doesn't hold off writing until he has
his substance fully in hand. Starting with at least something to say, he ex-
ploits the resources of composition to inspire and condition his own thinking.
Legislative drafting, involving probably the most disciplined writing out-
side mathematics, offers this potential in its fullest measure. Heller's idio-
syncracy is that he starts writing with very little mental warm-up.
Confirmation exists also in a recently published letter of E. B. White:
I always write a thing first and think about it afterward, which is not a
bad procedure, because the easiest way to have consecutive thoughts is
to start putting them down.4
The central idea here is that in the course of writing, the author, after
what may seem like trying to strike a damp match, soon finds that he is party
to a two-way conversation with what he has put on paper.5 The manuscript
is talking back to him. In current computer jargon, it is producing "feed-
back." I call it "talk-back." For the legal writer this talk-back is mostly
in the form of questions. And here we should remind ourselves that in the
development of workable ideas the primary thing is not to rush for right
answers, but to make sure that we are asking the right questions.6 This is
what disciplined writing helps to do.
Writing as Learning
Writing also helps research. Research is inefficient unless we know what
we are looking for, and trying to express and systematize a fuzzy question
helps us sharpen it.7 Robert Pirsig, in his fascinating book, Zen and the Art
of Motorcycle Maintenance, seems to have been thinking along these lines
when he wrote:
[F]acts do not exist until value has created them.
If they were all present at once our consciousness would be so jammed
with meaningless data we couldn't think or act. [T]he track
3 New York Times, see. 7, October 6, 1974, p. 1.
4 Letters of E. B. White (D. Guth ed., Harper & Row, 1976), p. 225. S. I. Hayakawa,
writing in the Chicago Tribune, see. 1, August 12, 1977, p. 14, asked, "Why is it that
I don't feel I have understood a difficult theory until I can write it in a way that
everyone can understand?"
5 "[W]riting is an aspect of dialogue, rather than merely monologue . . . an act
of communication, and not of broadcasting," quoting Van Nostrand, op. cit. supra
n. 1, at p. 17.
6 "The worst, the most corrupting, lies are problems poorly stated." Georges
Bernanos, French theologian quoted by Senator Daniel F. Moynihan at Baruch Col-
lege, Chicago Tribune, sec. 1, June 24, 1977, p. 11.
7 "[P]eople acquire knowledge about any subject simply by writing about it. They
do so by being forced to perceive relationships among the data that pertain to the
subject." Op. cit. supra n. 1, at p. 15.
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of Quality preselects what data we're going to be conscious of
"8
I once had 8 summer weeks to do a legal management project for the Fed-
eral Aviation Agency. My research in this instance was confined largely to
finding the experts and asking questions. Did I wait until the end of the
seventh week to start writing my report? I began writing it at the end of
the first week. Although the first draft was scrawny and feeble, my at-
tempts to organize it brought to the surface inconsistencies, gaps, and other
defects.
Writing that first draft at an early stage helped sharpen my sense of the
relevant in time to get full mileage out of it in my later interviewing. The
writer who tries to do all his research before he starts to write often finds
out later that he has researched many irrelevant or insignificant things, thus
wasting precious time, while he failed to research things that came to light
too late to handle adequately. It is good to find the basic defects, and the
earlier the better. Besides, if he over-researches before starting to write, he
risks snuffing out potentially valuable insights of his own before they have
had a chance to germinate in the delicate air of intellectual innocence. He
also risks creating a formidable psychological hazard by inundating himself
with detailed materials, distracting in their wide irrelevance, to the point of
sapping his will to write.
The best part of the "write early" approach is that it works.
Most of what I have been saying seems to be supported also by John Platt
in his book, The Step to Man.9 The relevant chapter is called "Strong In-
ference." Platt points out that some branches of science have moved for-
ward very much faster than others, because they have been using a method of
scientific research called the "accumulative method of inductive inference."
Its gist is to exploit the indirect method of proof by developing a range of
alternative hypotheses and seeing which ones can be eliminated, through criti-
cal experiment, as demonstrably false. Thus, no hypothesis is entertained
unless it is potentially refutable. For present purposes, the important fact
is that this method provides, for future testing, the sharpest possible hy-
potheses. This means that the supportive research will be highly relevant,
highly focused, and highly efficient. The result is quicker and more useful
results.
The lesson for legal writing is clear. Do not try to do all your research
first. Instead, begin to write, or at least to systematically organize your ma-
terial, as soon as you have a fairly good idea of what your problem is and a
generous inkling of the answer. Indeed, you should repeat the process
whenever your later research accumulates enough material that it starts to
become indigestible or hard to cope with. These phases correspond to the
scientist's periodic switches from hypothesis to verification to modified hy-
pothesis.
"[T]raining in writing . . . is a way of discovering things we didn't know
were there in our minds . . . . How will we know what we think until we see
what we have written?" M. Lerner, On the Art of Reading and Writing, Indianapolis
Star, February 14, 1977.
8 Win. Morrow (1974), p. 305.
9 John Wiley & Sons (1966), reprinted in 15 Jurimetrics J. 41 (1975).
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While writing, you should use every chance to encourage talk-back. For in-
stance, suppose you are typing energetically, trying to develop a coherent
line of thought. You discover a bad gap in your information. Do you turn
off your machine and run to the law library or a telephone? Not unless you
have reached a basic fork in the road. Instead, you fill the gap with state-
ments that blend logically with your current information or argumentation.
This gives you important, specific hypotheses that you can test later. Most
important, it heads off what could be a serious interruption.
If you take the other approach, insights that are perched precariously on
the tip of your mind may be gone by the time you come back to your type-
writer. The same applies to minor imperfections of spelling, grammar, or
form. While the draft is talking to you, don't fuss with details; get the gist
of its message on paper. Besides allowing the talk-back to continue, careful
interpolation or extrapolation will produce not only relatively specific hy-
potheses (which will focus later research) but ones that have the best chance
of being verified.
If the legal writer follows this general approach, some of the talk-back
will relate to matters of substantive policy that, properly dealt with, will make
the final product a better instrument of the client's will. Recognition of this
contribution is likely to earn the writer an opportunity to participate earlier
in the development of substantive policy. Ultimately, good performance will
elevate him to a more effective position as a supportive participant in making
policy.
The one real danger in the approach that I have urged is that the writer
may get so carried away with the beauties of his tentative results that he for-
gets to follow up with the research needed to verify them- (Every good thing
carries some risk.)
So far, most of what I have said applies to expository writing generally.
Let us now focus on legal drafting.
Until both draftsman and client have a fuller appreciation of what the
draftsman can do beyond manipulating language, many an otherwise able
draftsman will continue to be called in only at the last minute to put an other-
wise crystallized document into good "legal English." (How could a drafts-
man be more professionally demeaned!)
But getting in early, by itself, is not enough. The draftsman should make
sure that he ascertains the full scope of his client's problem and that he digs
out (and perfects) the concepts implicit in it. Because the substantive bene-
fits of taking these steps do not derive specially from the act of writing, I will
not discuss them here.
Probably the most basic step, and the compositional one most likely to pro-
duce useful talk-back, is to develop, at an appropriately early stage, a severely
hierarchical topical structure called an "outline." All the composition books
tell you to make an outline, but none that I have seen gives an- adequate ac-
count of how it should be conceptualized. I tried to remedy the situation in
chapter 5 of The Fundamentals of Legal Drafting,'0 but I'm afraid that I
left the reader awash in a sea of abstraction.
10 Little, Brown & Co. (1965).
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Pirsig did better by diagramming and summarizing the structure of a mo-
torcycle' 1 and, until we can find a better way to teach the fundamentals of
hierarchy (the backbone of the biologists' "taxonomy"), the best way is to
have each student writer begin by developing a thoroughgoing hierarchical
arrangement of the parts of some complicated physical object. Another use-
ful exercise might be to prepare an organization chart for an accessible local
organization. Unfortunately, such exercises fall short of full effectiveness
in. that at best they array observably discrete parts whose affinities are for
the most part already established and need only to be observed.
Where, on the other hand, the concepts implicit in the problem are not
clearly defined nor already sorted, conceptualization of the relevant com-
ponents and determining the most significant affinities are much harder.
Fortunately, intensive effort pays rich rewards in greater clarity and better
substance. (Look, for instance, at the table of contents of title 10 of the
United States Code.) '2
The main advantage of severely hierarchical arrangement is that it helps
produce the most significant juxtapositions of functionally related ideas.
These, in turn, facilitate the most significant comparisons. We are talking
here about the fundamentals of architecture. (The parallel with conventional
architecture is strikingly close.)
As the draftsman moves from the architecture of whole instruments to
that of particular sections, paragraphs, and sentences, there is a vast potential
for substantive talk-back in the use of such traditional branching devices as
tabulation 13 (also called "paragraph sculpture") and such newer and more
exotic branching devices as logic trees ' 4 and switching circuits (flow charts),
including "language normalization," 15 the latter of which exploits the re-
sources of symbolic logic and, in some cases, computers.
It would be nice to be able to give a fuller account here of written and
other visible devices for exploring and organizing concepts. Unfortunately,
the profession that faces man's most sophisticated communication problems
is still unable to produce an approach to legal drafting sophisticated enough
to cope with the increasingly complicated problems generated by our explod-
ing legal culture.
Supplementing sound arrangement as a means of producing substantive
talk-back, and fortunately much easier, are a number of other devices. One
of these is to insist on semantic and formal consistency throughout each in-
strument. Always say the same thing the same way. Always say different
things differently. If two sections are partly the same in substance, they
should, to the same extent and so far as feasible, be made similar in arrange-
' Op. cit. supra n. 8, at pp. 92-94.
12 70A Stat. (1956).
13 Op. cit. supra n. 10, at pp. 85-92.
14 E. g., P. Wason, The Drafting of Rules, 118 New L.J. (1968), p. 548; W. Twining
& D. Miers, Algorithms and the Structure of Complex Rules, in How To Do Things
With Rules (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1976), ch. 9.
15 L. Allen, A Language-Normalization Approach to Information Retrieval in Law,
9 Jurimetrics J. (1968), p. 41. See also T. Edwards & J. Barber, A Computer Method
for Legal Drafting Using Propositional Logic, 53 Tex.L.Rev. 965 (1975); R. Engholm,
Logic and Laws: Relief from Statutory Obfuscation, 9 J. of Law Reform 322 (1976).
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ment and expression. When the similarities are treated similarly, the im-
portant differences are much easier to spot. For instance, when trying to
make § 1203 of title 10 of the United States Code (dealing with the separa-
tion of regular military personnel) parallel in structure to its counterpart,§ 1201 (dealing with the retirement of regular military personnel), the re-
visers discovered that an important contingency had been omitted from the
source law for the former. Proximity was important because it drew atten-
tion to the need for uniformity.
These rules are put into practice by making specialized across-the-board
checks. It is amazing what substantive deficiencies you discover in a draft
when you root out what appear to be only inconsistencies of arrangement or
expression.
Another way to produce substantive talk-back is to make sure that all ma-
terial deviations from normal semantic understanding are removed. This is
the rule against "Humpty-Dumptyism." Humpty-Dumpty usages, such as
distorting the normal meaning of "supplies" to include repairs, cast a veil of
obscurity over a draft that can confuse even the author.
Also important is a purely mechanical, but by no means trivial, rule: Do
not turn loose as final any. draft that displays substantial editorial changes.
On this, let me quote my favorite text:
Drafts that seem to read well when badly marked up usually still con-
tain, when retyped, errors or inconsistencies or awkwardnesses of ex-
pression, so that it is a good policy to keep retyping and revising until
a clean draft reads satisfactorially without further revision. 16
These principles are the most important in legal drafting, because they not
only contribute greater clarity and readibility but, in so doing, tend to im-
prove the document as an instrument of substantive change.
The rest of the drafting process is to apply the familiar array of specific
principles and rules of semantics, grammar, and syntax. In mentioning
these only briefly, I do not downgrade them. Important as they are, they
need to be put in better perspective in the dynamics of drafting. At the same
time, we should recognize that, although many improvements have a lower
potential for producing talk-back, anything that increases clarity may uncover
desirable changes in substance.
Only if we take these principles to heart can we equip lawyers with the
training and opportunity necessary to perform the architectural and engi-
neering services that today's legal system badly needs.
16 Dickerson, supra note 6, p. 45.
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